1. The Indian Area
Part of the Ladakh region of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), the area of the Kargil conflict comprises approxi-mately 155 by 75 kilometres of harsh terrain, ranging bet-ween 9000 feet to 18,000 feet of high, craggy and snow-covered mountain peaks. It is bounded by the Zojila Pass on the west, Shyok River on the east, LOC on the north and the villages of Zojila, Sanko, Mulbek, Khalsi and Partapur form the southern flank. The area is sparsely populated with little rainfall, and therefore it is almost devoid of any cultivation and has practically no forests. Heavy snowfall in the winter together with the wind-chill factor lowers the temperature to between minus 30 to minus 40 degrees centigrade at night.
The three major rivers that flow through the area - running generally from south-east to north-west are the Shyok, Indus and Shingo. There are two major roads leading into the area - the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh (NH-1) road and the Manali-Leh road which is an alternative, unhindered and much deeper road link, far away from the LOC. The NH-1 closes in the middle of November, due to heavy snowfall whereas the Manali-Leh road, which passes over heights of above 14,000 feet, closes for traffic by the middle of October each year.
Kargil Tehsil itself has 88.4% Muslim population, most of them belonging to the Shia sect. However, Zaskar Tehsil has an overwhelming Buddhist population. The area provides an important road link between the Valley and the Northern areas of IOK, including to the Siachin Glacier, running close to the LOC.
2. The Pakistani Area
The Pakistani side of the Kargil Conflict region is similarly inhospitable, glaciated and consists of snowcapped mountains ranging from 10,000 to 18,000 feet. The area is bounded in the north by Skardu, in the south by the LOC, in the east by the Siachin Glacier and the Indus River and in the west by the Neelum Valley. The Shyok and Indus are the two major rivers that cut across the LOC, while the Neelum River flows westwards astride the LOC, after its entry into IOK. Surrounded by the massive Karakoram and Himalayan Ranges, the area is not very densely populated and is served through only one narrow road, which links Skardu with the area, across the Burzil Pass. The road remains open only for four months during the entire year and can barely sustain the civilian population of the area and the logistical requirements of army troops deployed to defend the area. It is vitally important to note that the road cannot support the logistical buildup for sustaining any sizeable offensive military operation.
3. Defence of the Pakistani Area 1
The defence of this region comes under the responsibility of the FCNA, which has an area of operation stretching from Siachin to Anzbari - a total distance of 175 kms. This is divided into four sectors:
Baltoro sector, located north west of Siachin Glacier, which includes access to some of the world's most famous peaks, including K-II, Broad Peak, the Gasherbrum series, Choglisa and Masherbrum.
Dansum-Shyok sector, which is bounded by River Hushe in the West, the Rimo Mountains in the East, Indira Koli Pass in the North and the Ladakh Range in the South. The Siachin Glacier lies to the Eastern end of this sector. To the West of Siachin is the Saltoro Range, which is also the Line of Actual Contact (LAC) between Pakistan and India. This region is largely a mass of glaciers and snow-covered peaks with heights in the range of 18,000 - 22,000 ft. Being snowbound for most part of the year, the area is extremely difficult to negotiate.
Skardu sector, which extends from the Ladakh Range and includes the Indus and Shingo Valleys. Kargil and Batalik are visible from some of the posts of this sector.
Minimarg sector, which extends from Shingo Valley to Anzbari. This sector is within the Great Himalayas and is separated from Skardu by the Deosai Plains with an average height of 14,080 ft. Burzil Pass provides the main access to this sector. The heights in the sector vary between 7,500 ft to 17,500 ft. A portion of the NH-1 - the Dras-Kargil Road - is visible to the Pakistani troops in this sector.
There are four approaches to the FCNA's area of responsibility:
I. The Siachin Glacier approach, which provides access to Dansum and further on to Khaplu on the Pakistani side.
II. The Shyok Valley approach, which connects Leh and Thoise with Skardu. India can isolate Siachin Glacier and unhinge defenses to its advantage.
III. The Indus Valley approach, which connects Leh with Skardu.
IV. The Kaksar-Shagma-Gultari-Burzil Pass app-roach, which begins from Kaksar and goes over Shagma-Gultari-Burzil Pass.
This approach is supplied by a number of small approaches through various nullahs. The FCNA has the following forces at its disposal for carrying out its responsibilities:
I. The HQ FCNA, located at Gilgit.
II. 323 Brigade, deployed at Dansum.
III 62 Brigade, (including one Wing of Civil Armed Forces) deployed at Skardu.
IV. 80 Brigade deployed at Minimarg.
V. FCNA Artillery, deployed along the entire front.
VI. 1 Reserve Battalion at Gilgit.
Within this operational framework, the FCNA is assigned the following tasks:
I. To defend the area of responsibility as far forward as tactically possible, so that no loss to territory occurs.
II. To deny India any success in so-called hot pursuit operations.
III. To be able to sustain these responsibilities while being prepared to detach some integral elements on order, for redeployment in other sectors.
IV. To ensure the protection of vulnerable areas/points against aerial operations, para operations and commando raids.
Within such a geographical terrain and India's past record, certain military conclusions have been drawn by the Pakistan military. For instance, both Pakistan and India adopt an exaggerated forward defence posture because of the susceptibility of the LOC to violations. Also, for Pakistan there are three strategic objectives to be preserved in the FCNA area of responsibility. These are defence of Skardu, Gilgit and prevention of severance of the Karakoram Highway. The capture of any of these, through a ground offensive alone is not possible, so the danger which Pakistan has to guard against is in the case of a full-fledged Indian offensive which would include air attacks and airborne elements. Beside these strategic objectives, some intermediate objectives also need to be guarded.
Military Options in this Zone of Operations
Even though Pakistan has the advantage of operating on interior lines of operation here, given the difficult terrain and the absence of adequate laterals, it would require a fair amount of time to shift reserves and firepower from one sector to another. So all these sectors need to be packed with dedicated reserves and fire power. For the Indians, the need would be to try and secure some depth for their vulnerable line of control through offensive options opposite Dras and Kargil at the operational level. At the tactical level, the Pakistan army has calculated that the Indians will continue to try and establish posts on the unoccupied heights as part of their post-Simla forward policy in Occupied Kashmir.
The scale of operations will primarily be limited to division/ brigade levels. Because of the extreme friction on the ground and insufficient communication infrastructure for deployment, large formations and large-scale operations along each approach is not feasible. The whole area can only allow the use of one or two divisions at a time, and that too after extensive logistic and troop build-up, which would give away the secrecy element. The speed of operations will also be very slow because of terrain and weather.
There is little flexibility available in terms of planning and conduct of operations and reorientation of direction of operation, subsequent to their commencement. Heavy reliance has to be placed on correct grouping, assessment of time and space, decentralization and self-sufficiency. The terrain and weather also create inaccuracies in mapping, surveying and information gathering and collation. For the offensive side, secrecy is critical in terms of assessment of forces, logistic build-up and gaining of the initial foothold. The maintenance of logistics support is critical for offensive operations. Perhaps the most important aspect with regard to any operation is to acclimatise the regular troops along with the need for specialized troops. The former process requires four to six weeks. Finally, the physical geography of the area has its impact on the high altitude military operations because the troops have to contend with extremely low temperatures - which fall to minus 30 to minus 40 degrees - as well as blizzards, limited visibility and white-out conditions. In addition, there are deep and narrow gorges in the glaciers, which give way, causing destruction of life and equipment. Simply moving on or negotiating glaciers also requires special training and equipment. Soldiers have to face pathological and psychological problems related specifically to high altitudes. So this is not an area where a large-scale strategic offensive military action can be planned and retain a semblance of secrecy.
Part of the Ladakh region of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), the area of the Kargil conflict comprises approxi-mately 155 by 75 kilometres of harsh terrain, ranging bet-ween 9000 feet to 18,000 feet of high, craggy and snow-covered mountain peaks. It is bounded by the Zojila Pass on the west, Shyok River on the east, LOC on the north and the villages of Zojila, Sanko, Mulbek, Khalsi and Partapur form the southern flank. The area is sparsely populated with little rainfall, and therefore it is almost devoid of any cultivation and has practically no forests. Heavy snowfall in the winter together with the wind-chill factor lowers the temperature to between minus 30 to minus 40 degrees centigrade at night.
The three major rivers that flow through the area - running generally from south-east to north-west are the Shyok, Indus and Shingo. There are two major roads leading into the area - the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh (NH-1) road and the Manali-Leh road which is an alternative, unhindered and much deeper road link, far away from the LOC. The NH-1 closes in the middle of November, due to heavy snowfall whereas the Manali-Leh road, which passes over heights of above 14,000 feet, closes for traffic by the middle of October each year.
Kargil Tehsil itself has 88.4% Muslim population, most of them belonging to the Shia sect. However, Zaskar Tehsil has an overwhelming Buddhist population. The area provides an important road link between the Valley and the Northern areas of IOK, including to the Siachin Glacier, running close to the LOC.
2. The Pakistani Area
The Pakistani side of the Kargil Conflict region is similarly inhospitable, glaciated and consists of snowcapped mountains ranging from 10,000 to 18,000 feet. The area is bounded in the north by Skardu, in the south by the LOC, in the east by the Siachin Glacier and the Indus River and in the west by the Neelum Valley. The Shyok and Indus are the two major rivers that cut across the LOC, while the Neelum River flows westwards astride the LOC, after its entry into IOK. Surrounded by the massive Karakoram and Himalayan Ranges, the area is not very densely populated and is served through only one narrow road, which links Skardu with the area, across the Burzil Pass. The road remains open only for four months during the entire year and can barely sustain the civilian population of the area and the logistical requirements of army troops deployed to defend the area. It is vitally important to note that the road cannot support the logistical buildup for sustaining any sizeable offensive military operation.
3. Defence of the Pakistani Area 1
The defence of this region comes under the responsibility of the FCNA, which has an area of operation stretching from Siachin to Anzbari - a total distance of 175 kms. This is divided into four sectors:
Baltoro sector, located north west of Siachin Glacier, which includes access to some of the world's most famous peaks, including K-II, Broad Peak, the Gasherbrum series, Choglisa and Masherbrum.
Dansum-Shyok sector, which is bounded by River Hushe in the West, the Rimo Mountains in the East, Indira Koli Pass in the North and the Ladakh Range in the South. The Siachin Glacier lies to the Eastern end of this sector. To the West of Siachin is the Saltoro Range, which is also the Line of Actual Contact (LAC) between Pakistan and India. This region is largely a mass of glaciers and snow-covered peaks with heights in the range of 18,000 - 22,000 ft. Being snowbound for most part of the year, the area is extremely difficult to negotiate.
Skardu sector, which extends from the Ladakh Range and includes the Indus and Shingo Valleys. Kargil and Batalik are visible from some of the posts of this sector.
Minimarg sector, which extends from Shingo Valley to Anzbari. This sector is within the Great Himalayas and is separated from Skardu by the Deosai Plains with an average height of 14,080 ft. Burzil Pass provides the main access to this sector. The heights in the sector vary between 7,500 ft to 17,500 ft. A portion of the NH-1 - the Dras-Kargil Road - is visible to the Pakistani troops in this sector.
There are four approaches to the FCNA's area of responsibility:
I. The Siachin Glacier approach, which provides access to Dansum and further on to Khaplu on the Pakistani side.
II. The Shyok Valley approach, which connects Leh and Thoise with Skardu. India can isolate Siachin Glacier and unhinge defenses to its advantage.
III. The Indus Valley approach, which connects Leh with Skardu.
IV. The Kaksar-Shagma-Gultari-Burzil Pass app-roach, which begins from Kaksar and goes over Shagma-Gultari-Burzil Pass.
This approach is supplied by a number of small approaches through various nullahs. The FCNA has the following forces at its disposal for carrying out its responsibilities:
I. The HQ FCNA, located at Gilgit.
II. 323 Brigade, deployed at Dansum.
III 62 Brigade, (including one Wing of Civil Armed Forces) deployed at Skardu.
IV. 80 Brigade deployed at Minimarg.
V. FCNA Artillery, deployed along the entire front.
VI. 1 Reserve Battalion at Gilgit.
Within this operational framework, the FCNA is assigned the following tasks:
I. To defend the area of responsibility as far forward as tactically possible, so that no loss to territory occurs.
II. To deny India any success in so-called hot pursuit operations.
III. To be able to sustain these responsibilities while being prepared to detach some integral elements on order, for redeployment in other sectors.
IV. To ensure the protection of vulnerable areas/points against aerial operations, para operations and commando raids.
Within such a geographical terrain and India's past record, certain military conclusions have been drawn by the Pakistan military. For instance, both Pakistan and India adopt an exaggerated forward defence posture because of the susceptibility of the LOC to violations. Also, for Pakistan there are three strategic objectives to be preserved in the FCNA area of responsibility. These are defence of Skardu, Gilgit and prevention of severance of the Karakoram Highway. The capture of any of these, through a ground offensive alone is not possible, so the danger which Pakistan has to guard against is in the case of a full-fledged Indian offensive which would include air attacks and airborne elements. Beside these strategic objectives, some intermediate objectives also need to be guarded.
Military Options in this Zone of Operations
Even though Pakistan has the advantage of operating on interior lines of operation here, given the difficult terrain and the absence of adequate laterals, it would require a fair amount of time to shift reserves and firepower from one sector to another. So all these sectors need to be packed with dedicated reserves and fire power. For the Indians, the need would be to try and secure some depth for their vulnerable line of control through offensive options opposite Dras and Kargil at the operational level. At the tactical level, the Pakistan army has calculated that the Indians will continue to try and establish posts on the unoccupied heights as part of their post-Simla forward policy in Occupied Kashmir.
The scale of operations will primarily be limited to division/ brigade levels. Because of the extreme friction on the ground and insufficient communication infrastructure for deployment, large formations and large-scale operations along each approach is not feasible. The whole area can only allow the use of one or two divisions at a time, and that too after extensive logistic and troop build-up, which would give away the secrecy element. The speed of operations will also be very slow because of terrain and weather.
There is little flexibility available in terms of planning and conduct of operations and reorientation of direction of operation, subsequent to their commencement. Heavy reliance has to be placed on correct grouping, assessment of time and space, decentralization and self-sufficiency. The terrain and weather also create inaccuracies in mapping, surveying and information gathering and collation. For the offensive side, secrecy is critical in terms of assessment of forces, logistic build-up and gaining of the initial foothold. The maintenance of logistics support is critical for offensive operations. Perhaps the most important aspect with regard to any operation is to acclimatise the regular troops along with the need for specialized troops. The former process requires four to six weeks. Finally, the physical geography of the area has its impact on the high altitude military operations because the troops have to contend with extremely low temperatures - which fall to minus 30 to minus 40 degrees - as well as blizzards, limited visibility and white-out conditions. In addition, there are deep and narrow gorges in the glaciers, which give way, causing destruction of life and equipment. Simply moving on or negotiating glaciers also requires special training and equipment. Soldiers have to face pathological and psychological problems related specifically to high altitudes. So this is not an area where a large-scale strategic offensive military action can be planned and retain a semblance of secrecy.