The Eastern Fleet based at Visakhapatnam faced virtually no opposition from the Pakistan Navy in the Bay of Bengal. Apart from the aircraft carrier Vikrant and her escorts, there were in the area, an amphibious group consisting of the three LSTs Magar, Gharial and Guldar and the submarine Khanderi operating independently. The Pakistan Navy had never maintained in East Pakistan more than a gunboat squadron and a few odd riverine craft on a permanent basis. Consequently, repair and logistic facilities for large ships had not been developed at Chittagong. Further, the division of the Destroyer Squadron would only have further weakened the force in the Arabian Sea, without being able to generate any comparable opposition in the Bay of Bengal.
There were, it appears, in addition to the main aim of enforcing a complete blockade of East Pakistan and cutting off its lines of communications from the west, the following objectives of the Indian Navy in the eastern theatre:
a. Destruction/neutralisation of airfields at Chittagong and Cox's Bazar.
b. Bombardment of East Pakistan's parts to destroy or damage port installations and ships.
c. Bombardment of riverine traffic to disrupt logistic supplies of dispersed Pakistan Army units largely dependent on water transport.
d. Bombardment of troop concentrations in support of army operations in coastal areas.
e. Amphibious landing, if required, to support army operations.
With the accidental removal of Ghazi from the scene earlier on, the field was clear. The Indian Navy embarked on its assigned tasks without fear of opposition, and exerted constant pressure from seaward as the Indian Army moved in to close the ring round East Pakistan from several directions on land.
Starting on 4 December the aircraft carrier Vikrant launched a series of air strikes on a variety of targets along East Pakistan's coast. Using Seahawks by day and Alizes by night the pressure was kept up by the aircraft carrier throughout the war. On the very first day, during raids carried out over Chittagong harbour, the outer anchorage, and the airfield, and the airstrip at Cox's Bazar, the Indians succeeded in inflicting considerable damage to ships and shore installations. The gunboat Comilla was sunk and Rajshahi severely damaged during an air attack on the outer anchorage.
On 5 and 6 December carrier-borne aircraft carried out attacks on Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river. The oil installations at Chittagong caught fire and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage. In strikes over Chittagong on 7 December the oil installations and the airfield were again hit and damaged. Troop concentrations in Barisal, Bakarganj and Patuakhali areas were subjected to attacks by carrier aircraft on 8 and 9 December. Pounding of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar airfields by carrier-borne aircraft continued on the request, at least on two occasions, of AO C-in-C Eastern Command, (the Indian Air Force Commander in the East), who suspected that these airfields were being used by the PAF for air operations.
With no opposition from the Pakistan Navy at sea, and by the PAF in the air, defence against air strikes by carrier-borne aircraft was confined to anti-aircraft fire by gunboats and shore batteries. The Indians have acknowledged heavy resistance to most of their air strikes by Pakistan anti-aircraft defence and accepted the loss of some aircraft. But such a limited effort was, by itself, insufficient to curb, in any meaningful way, the onslaught by the Indian naval air arm from seaward. On 12 December, emboldened by the lack of any serious retaliation, the Indian Navy ships closed Cox's Bazar and carried out a bombardment of the airfield in broad day light. They succeeded in damaging the control tower at the airport during this operation.
Fearing a possible amphibious landing the approaches to Chittagong were mined by the Pakistan Navy on 7 December. This minefield, laid as a defensive measure to check the movement of Indian ships towards the harbour, was subsequently reinforced by more mines on 9 and 12 December. This proved to be a most useful step in that it denied to Indian forces direct access to Chittagong port for a long time, even after the instrument of surrender had been signed.
The Indians therefore decided to carry out an amphibious landing at Cox's Bazar with the aim of cutting off the line of retreat of Pakistani troops from this direction. Having embarked a battalion of Gurkhas, the amphibious force comprising the merchant vessel Vishwa Vijaya and the LSTs Gharial and Guldar, sailed from Calcutta on 12 December. The landing was carried out at the chosen site south of Cox's Bazar on the night of 15/16 December, after bombardment of the beach a day earlier. Though no opposition was offered by Pakistani forces the Indians, after experiencing same difficulties, succeeded in putting troops on the beach. At least two Indian soldiers are reported to have last their lives in the operation, which appears to have served no purpose at this belated stage except to show that it had an amphibious capability, and that the Indian Navy was free to operate at will in the Bay of Bengal.
The Indian Navy Task Force comprising the carrier Vikrant and her escorts the Brahmaputra and Beas, while manoeuvring freely in the Bay of Bengal interdicted shipping traffic to and from East Pakistan ports. Reports from Chittagong indicated that this group sometimes closed the coast to a range as close as 12 to 15 miles, not surprising in a situation in which the Pakistan Navy lacked altogether any means to react or retaliate from Chittagong. Commodore in Charge Chittagong could do no more than report the approach of these ships. The sinking and capture of several merchant ships by the carrier group and the diversion to neutral ports by the Naval Control of Shipping, reduced shipping traffic to East Pakistan to a trickle within a few days. The unchallenged presence of this force in the area ruled out possibility of reinforcements from the West in the beginning of the war, and evacuation of our troops at a later stage when such a need was felt.
There were, it appears, in addition to the main aim of enforcing a complete blockade of East Pakistan and cutting off its lines of communications from the west, the following objectives of the Indian Navy in the eastern theatre:
a. Destruction/neutralisation of airfields at Chittagong and Cox's Bazar.
b. Bombardment of East Pakistan's parts to destroy or damage port installations and ships.
c. Bombardment of riverine traffic to disrupt logistic supplies of dispersed Pakistan Army units largely dependent on water transport.
d. Bombardment of troop concentrations in support of army operations in coastal areas.
e. Amphibious landing, if required, to support army operations.
With the accidental removal of Ghazi from the scene earlier on, the field was clear. The Indian Navy embarked on its assigned tasks without fear of opposition, and exerted constant pressure from seaward as the Indian Army moved in to close the ring round East Pakistan from several directions on land.
Starting on 4 December the aircraft carrier Vikrant launched a series of air strikes on a variety of targets along East Pakistan's coast. Using Seahawks by day and Alizes by night the pressure was kept up by the aircraft carrier throughout the war. On the very first day, during raids carried out over Chittagong harbour, the outer anchorage, and the airfield, and the airstrip at Cox's Bazar, the Indians succeeded in inflicting considerable damage to ships and shore installations. The gunboat Comilla was sunk and Rajshahi severely damaged during an air attack on the outer anchorage.
On 5 and 6 December carrier-borne aircraft carried out attacks on Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur river. The oil installations at Chittagong caught fire and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the outer anchorage. In strikes over Chittagong on 7 December the oil installations and the airfield were again hit and damaged. Troop concentrations in Barisal, Bakarganj and Patuakhali areas were subjected to attacks by carrier aircraft on 8 and 9 December. Pounding of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar airfields by carrier-borne aircraft continued on the request, at least on two occasions, of AO C-in-C Eastern Command, (the Indian Air Force Commander in the East), who suspected that these airfields were being used by the PAF for air operations.
With no opposition from the Pakistan Navy at sea, and by the PAF in the air, defence against air strikes by carrier-borne aircraft was confined to anti-aircraft fire by gunboats and shore batteries. The Indians have acknowledged heavy resistance to most of their air strikes by Pakistan anti-aircraft defence and accepted the loss of some aircraft. But such a limited effort was, by itself, insufficient to curb, in any meaningful way, the onslaught by the Indian naval air arm from seaward. On 12 December, emboldened by the lack of any serious retaliation, the Indian Navy ships closed Cox's Bazar and carried out a bombardment of the airfield in broad day light. They succeeded in damaging the control tower at the airport during this operation.
Fearing a possible amphibious landing the approaches to Chittagong were mined by the Pakistan Navy on 7 December. This minefield, laid as a defensive measure to check the movement of Indian ships towards the harbour, was subsequently reinforced by more mines on 9 and 12 December. This proved to be a most useful step in that it denied to Indian forces direct access to Chittagong port for a long time, even after the instrument of surrender had been signed.
The Indians therefore decided to carry out an amphibious landing at Cox's Bazar with the aim of cutting off the line of retreat of Pakistani troops from this direction. Having embarked a battalion of Gurkhas, the amphibious force comprising the merchant vessel Vishwa Vijaya and the LSTs Gharial and Guldar, sailed from Calcutta on 12 December. The landing was carried out at the chosen site south of Cox's Bazar on the night of 15/16 December, after bombardment of the beach a day earlier. Though no opposition was offered by Pakistani forces the Indians, after experiencing same difficulties, succeeded in putting troops on the beach. At least two Indian soldiers are reported to have last their lives in the operation, which appears to have served no purpose at this belated stage except to show that it had an amphibious capability, and that the Indian Navy was free to operate at will in the Bay of Bengal.
The Indian Navy Task Force comprising the carrier Vikrant and her escorts the Brahmaputra and Beas, while manoeuvring freely in the Bay of Bengal interdicted shipping traffic to and from East Pakistan ports. Reports from Chittagong indicated that this group sometimes closed the coast to a range as close as 12 to 15 miles, not surprising in a situation in which the Pakistan Navy lacked altogether any means to react or retaliate from Chittagong. Commodore in Charge Chittagong could do no more than report the approach of these ships. The sinking and capture of several merchant ships by the carrier group and the diversion to neutral ports by the Naval Control of Shipping, reduced shipping traffic to East Pakistan to a trickle within a few days. The unchallenged presence of this force in the area ruled out possibility of reinforcements from the West in the beginning of the war, and evacuation of our troops at a later stage when such a need was felt.